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STATE OF UTAHf 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS CARTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860063 
Priority 1 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The State submits this second supplemental brief in 
response to defendant's second supplemental brief submitted May 
6, 1988. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REVIEW OF CAPITAL CASES FOR PLAIN ERROR. 
The State does not dispute that this Court has stated 
it will review capital cases for plain error even in the absence 
of an objection at trial. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546f 551 
(Utah 1987). The State does not agree, however, that there were 
any errors committed at trial that require reversal of 
defendant's conviction or death sentence. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE COURT 
READING THE INFORMATION TO THE JURY. 
Defendant's claim tha t he was prejudiced by the 
language of the information is without merit. He asserts that 
the jury was led to believe that he was charged with more than 
one crime because the information cited two statutes in the 
single first-degree murder charge. Yet he admits that the jury 
was properly instructed on the elements of first-degree murder 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1987). Because the jury 
was appropriately instructed on the elements of the crime and 
only one criminal act was allegedf proven and instructed uponf 
there was no error in the information citing to both statutes and 
defendant was not prejudiced by the court reading the 
information. It is unlikely that the jury thought defendant was 
charged with anything more than the single count of first degree 
under upon which they were instructed. 
In support of his claim defendant cites United States 
v. Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1986). Marquardt is 
inapposite here because it discusses multipicitous charges or 
"charging the same defendant with the same offense in several 
different counts." Id., at 778. Here, defendant was charged with 
only one offense even though two statutes were cited andf 
therefore, there was no multiplicity involved. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT ALLEGES NO ERROR FOR THIS COURT TO 
REVIEW ON THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
Defendant claims that he is prejudiced by an inability 
to attack the peremptory jury challenges exercised by the State 
because there is no record of these challenges. The record does, 
however, contain a list of those potential jurors that were 
stricken by both parties from the jury panel (R. 101-102) . Other 
than this list, there would normally be no other record of the 
peremptory challenges to review unless defendant objected to an 
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improper challenge by the State at the time they were exercised. 
Here, defendant does not intimate what he suspects might have 
been improper about the peremptories and his claim is meritless. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
AT TRIAL EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE NO AUDIO OR 
STENOGRAPHIC RECORDINGS OF DEFENDANTS 
PRECISE WORDS WHERE DEFENDANT SIGNED THE 
STATEMENT ADOPTING IT AS HIS OWN AND WHERE 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF COERCION. 
Defendant argues that his confession should not have 
been admitted at trial under a rule that he urges this Court to 
adopt for capital cases. While it is apparent that the State 
would be unduly prejudiced by the application of such a rule to 
this case rather than prospectively only, this brief does not 
discuss the retroactivity issue because the State asserts that 
the rule is inappropriate in any case. 
Defendant urges this Court to rule that confessions of 
first-degree murderers must be recorded verbatim by either a tape 
or stenographic recording. Not only is defendant's argument 
unsupported by any authority, but it is flawed in its claim that 
such a rule would do more to preserve a defendant's rights or 
protect against involuntary confessions. 
First, there are some reasonable bases for a claim that 
recording statements will eliminate some opportunities for 
coercion, but there is no guarantee that a police officer who 
attempts to coerce a suspect into confessing a crime would turn 
on a tape recorder or invite in a stenographer during the 
coercive session. Thus, short of requiring officers to record 
their entire lives, there is nothing about taping or otherwise 
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recording a suspect's exact words that would guarantee 
elimination of coercive tactics prior to the recording session. 
While the State agrees that it is good police practice 
to record the statements of suspects, it does not agree that the 
lack of a recording should be fatal to a finding of voluntariness 
or admissibility of the statement in any case. In Utah, 
confessions are presumed voluntary unless a defendant presents 
some evidence to rebut this presumption. State v. Hinton, 6 80 
P.2d 749, 750 (Utah 1984). Defendant's proposed rule implies 
that the opposite should be true in capital cases; that 
confessions are presumed involuntary unless the State can prove 
otherwise. Defendant offers no good reason why this Court should 
reverse its position in this or any other case, or any convincing 
reason why his proposed rule should apply only in capital cases. 
Defendant further asserts that he was prejudiced 
because his voice or his exact words were not heard by the jury. 
Defendant didf nevertheless, read the statement and sign it and, 
thus, adopted it as his own. See State v. Ellis, 374 P.2d 461, 
467-68 (Or. 1962); Hommer v. State, 657 P.2d 172, 175 (Okla. Cr. 
App. 1983). As in Hommer there is no evidence of any significant 
errors, omissions or additions in the statement introduced at 
trial. In the absence of any of these things, and where the 
statement represented the substance of what defendant told 
Detective Pierpont, defendant was not prejudiced by the 
introduction of the statement he signed. See Deerman v* State, 
466 So. 2d 1013, 1018 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984); State v. Morris, 163 
P. 567, 571 (Or. 1917). "A statement which is reduced to writing 
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by one other than the accused is generally admissible where the 
accused reads it over and signs it." United States v. Johnson, 
529 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1976) cert, denied 96 S. Ct. 2233 
(1976) . 
Finally, the best evidence rule would not require 
admission of the actual tape recording even if one existed in 
this case. See Deerman, 466 So. 2d at 1018; and see 23 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law, § 833(e) (1961). Defendant was not, therefore, 
prejudiced by the lack of a recording of his statement. 
POINT V 
THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT MISCONDUCT 
DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed 
prejudicial misconduct in closing argument by misstating facts, 
commenting on defendant's failure to testify and vouching for a 
witness. A review of the closing arguments reveals no misconduct 
and defendant's conviction and death sentence should be affirmed. 
A. Alleged Mistatement Of Facts. 
During closing arguments the prosecutor did refer to 
defendant's confession several times as being defendant's own 
words as defendant alleges. These references were not 
misstatements, however, because even if defendant did not 
actually place pen to paper, defendant read and signed the 
confession adopting it as his own. United States v. Johnson, 529 
F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1976) cert, denied 96 S. Ct. 2233 (1976); 
State v. Ellis, 374 P.2d 461, 467-68 (Or. 1962); Hommer v. State, 
657 P.12d 172, 175 (Okla. Cr. App. 1983). For this reason, the 
State was entitled to characterize the confession as defendant's 
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own words and there was no misstatement of facts, thusf no 
misconduct since the prosecutor had "a right to discuss fully ... 
the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom." State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988) 
quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 
(1973) . 
B. Alleged Coments On Defendant's Failure To Testify. 
While the State agrees that a prosecutor may not 
comment on a defendant's failure to testify at trial, the remarks 
defendnat complains of here were not such a comment. The passage 
quoted by defendant was a comment upon the lack of any evidence 
supporting defendant's claim that he was coerced to confess. 
Such evidence could have been elicited from other sources, such 
as the police officers who were present during the confession, 
and the remark does not necessarily imply that the evidence was 
lacking because defendant failed to testify. Defendant's claim 
on this point is tenuous at best. 
The prosecutor may comment on the weaknesses of the 
defendant's case. State v. Kazda. 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975). The 
remark here did no more than that and was not the same as the 
remarks in State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1115 (Utah 1977) where 
the prosecutor stressed that there was no evidence from the 
defendant" who was one of the only two eyewitnesses to the crime 
and also asked "What does the defendant tell us?" 
Even, if the remark did imply that defendant should have 
testified, it was harmless in light of the evidence of 
defendant's guilt. Eaton, 569 P.2d at 1116. There is little 
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likelihood of a different result absent the remarks of the 
prosecutor. Id. 
C. Alleged Vouching* 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor erred by stating 
his personal opinion that Lucia Tovar was a credible witness. 
The prosecutor did nothing here, however, that approached the 
type of vouching that has been held to be error. In United 
States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029, 1046-47 (11th Cir. 1986), the 
court disapproved commments by a prosecutor that imply the 
government possesses some knowledge that the jury lacks 
supporting the witness1 testimony or by making "explicit personal 
assurances of the witness1 veracity•" Id., at 1046. Neither of 
these two things happened here and the prosecutor's comments 
could fairly be construed to be comments upon the witness1 
demeanor in court which the jury was able to observe for itself. 
There was no attempt to supplant the jury's perceptions with 
those of the prosecutor's and no error. 
Even if the comments can be construed as vouching for 
the witness' credibility, they were harmless in this case. They 
were isolated as defendant admits, See People v. Smith, 685 P.2d 
786, 790 (Colo. App. 1984), and it is unlikely that the jury 
based its verdict, in whole or in part, on the comments. The 
comments were not prejudicial because it was not "clear and 
unmistakable that counsel [was] not arguing an inference from the 
evidence, ..." State v. Sargent, 698 P.2d 598, 601 (Wash. App. 
1985) quoting State v. Papadopoulos, 34 Wash. App. 397, 400, 662 
P.2d 59, rev, denied. 100 Wash. 2d 1003 (1983). 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE STATE'S 
INVESTIGATOR TO REMAIN IN THE COURTROOM 
DURING TRIAL. 
Defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the court 
allowing the State's investigator to remain in the courtroom 
during the trial after he requested exclusion of the witnesses. 
He acknowledges that the ruling was proper under Utah R. Evid. 
615 (2) and that the purpose of the exclusionary rule; to prevent 
witnesses from gaining information from other witnesses' 
testimony; was not offended. He arguesf however, that the jury 
could have gathered from the witness' presence at counsel table 
that the State believed in the witness' credibility. This 
argument lacks substance and establishes no reversible error. 
A similar argument was summarily rejected by the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 
1102f 1115 (8th Cir. 1979). This Court should also disregard 
this argument without lingering long. Any time the State 
presents a witness whose testimony supports the State's theory of 
the crime, there is an implication that the State believes the 
witness is credible. This occurs regardless of whether the 
witness is seated at the prosecutor's table or excluded from the 
courtroom. There was no unfair prejudice to defendant where the 
prosecutor did not comment on the witness' credibility or attempt 
to substitute his judgment for that of the jury's. 
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POINT VII 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL. 
Defendant claims that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because counsel was unprepared for trial 
and because of the lack of mitigating evidence presented at 
penalty phase. Defendant's claimsf while they may establish 
deficient performance/ do not establish demonstrable prejudice as 
required by State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1023-25 (Utah 
1987) . 
The decision of trial counsel on what mitigating 
evidence to present may be explained by trial strategy. Counsel 
may have felt that the alienists1 testimony would have been more 
damaging than their reports since the prosecutor would have been 
able to cross examine them and stress more damaging evidence than 
was contained in the written reports. 
Defendant further speculates that his attorney could 
have offered evidence from defendant's mother, brother, ex-wife, 
and young son or from unnamed friends, former employers or 
"others having significant association with defendant." Br. of 
App. at 36. Such speculation does not establish demonstrable 
prejudice. See Archuleta. 
POINT VIII 
THERE WAS NO ERRORf CDMDLATIVE OR OTHERWISE, 
WARRANTING REVERSAL OF DEFENDANTS CONVICTION 
OR DEATH SENTENCE. 
Defendant requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction on the basis of eitherindividually prejudicial or 
cumulative error. Based upon the foregoing discussion of 
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defendant's allegations of error, reversal of his conviction is 
not warranted on the basis of any individual error or on a theory 
of cumulative error. Because the trial court, at most, committed 
harmless error, defendant's conviction should be affirmed. See 
Hawkes v. State. 644 P.2d 111, 113 (Okl. Cr. 1982); State v. 
McKenzie, 608 P.2d 428, 448 (Mont. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 
1050; United States v. Bohr. 581 F.2d 1294, 1304 (8th Cir. 1978), 
cert, denied. 439 U.S. 958. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's conviction and death sentence. 
DATED this £> day of \A^Y<± , 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
y '^SANDRA L. 
Assistant (Mftortfey'^ General 
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